This paper presents an extension of maxmed mechanisms introduced by Sprumont (JET, 2013) to the multiple homogeneous object setting. To address the complexities of the multiple objects setting, we consider special families of mechanisms, which contain a mechanism for each possible number of available objects. We interpret these families as ex-ante sale procedures, which specify different mechanisms to allocate different quantities of objects. We identify and completely characterize the maxmed families, which use the (extended) maxmed mechanisms to allocate any number of available objects while using the same non-negative reserve price. The maxmed families turn out to be the only families that are Pareto optimal among well-behaved families comprising mechanisms that satisfy a set of desirable axioms, including the ones used by Sprumont (JET, 2013): anonymity, strategyproofness, no-envy, feasibility and individual rationality.
CO Author: Conan Mukherjee
Journal: Review of Economic Design
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